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CASE NOTES
clared that an invalid provision which is a material part of the entire con-
sideration voids the entire contract.
However the court in the instant case endorsed the public policy that
refuses to aid a party who has benefited from an agreement and now seeks
to have it held void. In this case non-enforcement of the illegal contract
would be injurious to the deceased wife's estate, and enforcement would
benefit plaintiff who has already enjoyed the maximum benefits of his
wife's release. Since enforcement of the contract would contravene public
policy, the court held the parties to the terms of the agreement.
In holding support waivers invalid because of public policy, courts seek
to protect the wife as well as the public which might have to support the
wife if waiver of the support duty was tolerated. The court cited Central
Republic Trust Co. v. Evans.1' which stated:
Public policy frequently requires the enforcement of a contract tinged with
illegality where not to do so would produce a harmful result on the persons
for whose protection the law violated exists.17
This rationale for the enforcement of an invalid contract has frequently
been applied to cases involving business contracts, but rarely if ever to
separation agreements.
By overruling the Lyons case, the court has met an important criticism,
viz., that its earlier decision had overstressed the invalidation of an entire
separation agreement because of the presence of an express support waiver
and, as a consequence, had unjustly enriched the husband-claimant. Con-
sistency has now been achieved through protecting the wife and the pub-
lic while simultaneously preventing the husband's unjust enrichment.
16 378 111. 58, 37 N.E. 2d 745 (1941).
17 Ibid., at 71 and 751.
EVIDENCE-REFUSAL TO PERMIT CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF WITNESS AS TO DRUG ADDICTION FOR
IMPEACHMENT PURPOSES HELD
REVERSIBLE ERROR
Defendant was convicted of murder largely upon the testimony of an
accomplice witness, and the jury recommended the maximum penalty. The
trial court sustained objection to the following questions by the defense
on cross examination of the accomplice witness:
1. "Are you a narcotic addict?"
2. "Do you take the stuff?"
3. "Did you ever take heroin?"
4. "Didn't you, on March 20th, buy some narcotics and pay $17.00 for it?"
a'tL DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
In a case of first impression the Illinois Supreme Court held that the re-
fusal to permit cross-examination of an accomplice witness as to his drug
addiction for the purpose of impeaching the witness' credibility was
prejudicial error. People v. Crump, 5 Ill. 2d 251, 125 N.E. 2d 615 (1955).
The supreme court restated the general rule in Illinois that
it is proper to cross-examine a witness to bring out the witness' unlawful and
disreputable occupation and activity as a matter affecting credibility. 1
This rule is based on three leading cases which were relied upon by the
defense in support of the contention that the cross-examination was prop-
er. Two of them, People v. Bond2 and People v. Winchester,3 were prose-
cutions for murder in which the court held it proper to cross-examine a
witness to bring out the fact that the witness operated a house of prosti-
tution. The third case, People v. White,4 also a prosecution for murder,
held that the rule applied to an alibi witness whose chief occupation was
the operation of a gambling house. In the Bond case, the court stated that
if a witness is engaged in an unlawful and disreputable occupation, in justice
and fairness he should not be permitted to appear before the jury as a person
of high character who is engaged in a lawful and respectable occupation. 5
Although these cases did not pass on the precise factual question at issue
in the instant case, they serve to outline the attitude taken by the Illinois
courts.
There is conflict in other jurisdictions as to whether addiction to, or
mere use of, narcotics may be shown to affect credibility. A Montana case,
State v. Gleim,O held that in order to discredit or weaken the testimony of
a witness it is not enough to show that he in the habit of using opiates;
the proof must go further and establish that the powers of recollection are
impaired by the habitual or excessive use of it or that he was under the
influence of the opiate at the time the transaction occurred or is under its
influence at the time of the trial. The courts of Tennessee,7 Minnesota,8
and Nebraska9 have excluded evidence, both of narcotic addiction by the
witness and expert evidence as to the effects of such use. It had also been
held improper cross-examination to inquire whether a witness was ad-
dicted to narcotics ten years earlier. 10
1 People v. Crump, 5 111. 2d 251, 260, 125 N.E. 2d 615, 620 (1955). Emphasis added.
2 281 111. 490, 118 N.E. 14 (1917). 3 352 1ll. 237, 185 N.E. 580 (1933).
4 251 111. 67, 95 N.E. 1036 (1911).
5 People v. Bond, 281 Ill. 490, 499, 118 N.E. 14, 18 (1917).
6 17 Mont. 17, 41 Pac. 998 (1895).
7 Franklin v. Franklin, 90 Tenn. 44, 16 S.W. 557 (1891).
8 State v. King, 88 Minn. 175, 92 N.W. 965 (1903).
9 Katleman v. State. 104 Neb. 62, 175 N.W. 671 (1919).
10Webb v. People, 97 Colo. 262, 49 P. 2d 381 (1935).
CASE NOTES
A somewhat different rule was set out in the case of State v. Jordan," a
murder case in which a witness for the prosecution was asked on cross-
examination if she was a drug addict and she stated that she was not. The
Oregon Supreme Court approved the trial court's action in sustaining an
objection to further inquiry into the question of addiction. While the lan-
guage of the court is not entirely clear, the case was apparently decided
on the theory that the question was collateral and that the defendant was
precluded from further pursuit of the matter by the witness' denial of
drug use.
One of the leading cases on this subject, State v. Prentice,12 upheld the
contrary view that the use of narcotics by a witness is a material fact and
the denial of such use may be attacked. In this case, an alibi witness for the
defendant charged with larceny denied, on cross-examination, that she
used morphine. The defense was unsuccessful in its contention that the is-
sue was a collateral one and, therefore, that the answers on cross-examina-
tion were conclusive. The Supreme Court of Iowa held it proper to admit
evidence of a druggist that the witness had purchased the drug from him.
One of the oldest cases upholding this view is People v. Webster, 3 a
murder case in which an eyewitness for the defense admitted on cross-
examination that she had the opium habit and was under its influence at
the time of the killing, though "no more than any other time." Regarding
the extent of her habit, the witness denied making an admission that the
deprivation of the drug would kill her, and the court held that such was
a denial of a material fact and might be contradicted.
Similarly it has been held that one acting as the interpreter of the dying
declaration of a foreigner alleged to have been murdered may be cross-ex-
amined as to whether he is an habitual user of narcotics. The court
pointed out that this evidence went to the credibility of the witness, not
to his competency to testify.14 Further support to this view has come from
the courts of Texas'5 and Nevada.16
It seems appropriate to quote the language of the Supreme Court of
Washington in the recent case of Lankford v. Tombari17 in which the
court stated:
There is a difference of judicial opinion as to the relevancy of the drug habit
or the mere use of narcotics ... to propensity for veracity. The view of a ma-jority of the courts and the better view, according to Wigmore, is that it is
relevant .... ' 8
11 146 Ore. 504, 26 P. 2d 558 (1933).
12 192 Iowa 207, 183 N.W. 411 (1921). 13 139 N.Y. 73, 34 N.E. 730 (1893).
14 State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 Pac. 233 (1916).
'
5 Beland v. State, 86 Tex. Crim. Rep. 285, 217 S.W. 147 (1920).
16Effinger v. Effinger, 48 Nev. 205, 239 Pac. 801 (1925).
17 35 Wash. 2d 412, 213 P. 2d 627 (1950). 18 Ibid., at 632.
